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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
" We acquiesce in the conclusion arrived at, so far as the case at
bar is concerned."
We are of opinion that the true rule upon this question, is that
laid down in Graham v. Anderson, 42 Ill. 514. That case was
much stronger than the one before us, for there were allegations
touching privy examination of the wife, &c. The court, after dis-
cussing some other features of the case, said: 1" But another more
important question remains, and that is, in the absence of fraud or
imposition, in proving the execution of a deed by a wife, is parol
evidence admissible in an action of ejectment to impeach the certifi-
cate? We have examined the authorities on this point, and we
think where the certificate of the privy examination of a married
woman is in the form required by statute, it is not sufficient, in
order to impeach it, to allege that there was no private examina-
tion, that she did not acknowledge the deed as her act and deed,
that shb did not release her homestead right. There must be some
allegation of fraud or imposition practiced toward her, some fraudu-
lent combination between the parties interested, and the officer
taking the acknowledgment :" IRidgely v. i-oward, 3 H. & McII.
321; Jamison v. Jamison, 3 Whart. 457; BHartley v. Trost, 6
Texas 208. Green v. Godfrey, 45 Maine 25, which was an action
of ejectment, is to the same effect.
We are therefore of opinion that in an action of ejectment where
the certificate of the officer as to the acknowledgment appears on
its face to be in substantial compliance with the statute, parol evi-
dence to impeach it is inadmissible, unless there are allegations in
the pleadings to warrant it. Judgment affirmed.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
1
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
2
SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.
3
AGENT.
Performance by Deputy.-One having authority to sign the name of
another to a subscription paper, may.procure a third to do it in his
presence: Norwich University v. Dana, 47 Vt.
I From E. L. DeWitt, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 25 Ohio State Reports.
2 From P. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 77 Pennsylvania Reports.
3 From Hon. J. W. Rowell, Reporter ; to appear in 47 Vermont Reports.
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ASSU'.NIPSIT.
Liabilly for Services ,eformedjbr Another.--Tn .order to make one
liable tor service perfbrned for another, he must either thereunto ex-
pressly proilse, or so conduct himself that the party rendering the ser-
vice has a right to understand, and does understand, that lie will be
responisible therefor : Rediel v. Dana, 47 Vt.
ATTACIIMENT.
.Garnidsee-Potument to Debtor (fter Service.-In an action by theplaintiff in attachment against the gairnishee, to recover money in his
hands at the time process was served by copies left at his usual place
of rezidence, it is no defence for the garnishee to show that he was ab-
sent from lionie at the time of such service, and that his agent, who had
knowledge of the time and manner of the service, afterward, and before
his return, paid over the money in his hands to the defendant in attach-
ment before the garnishee had actual notice : Conleq v. (hilcote, 25
Ohio State.
It is not an available defence in such action for the garnishee to show
that the defendant in attachment was entitled to and could have held
the money in his hands at the time of the service of garnishee process,
under the exemption laws of the state: id.
ATTORNEY..
Fees are not £Osts.-In an action on an injunction bond, the plaintiff
cannot recover for attorneys' fees in the original case, except those paid
for services rendered in efforts to dissolve or modify the provisional in-
junction, or otherwise occasioned by its allowance or subsistence : Rid-
dIle et al. v. Cheadle, 25 Ohio State.
]3ILLS AND NOTES.
Defence against Holder.-In a suit by an endorser on a negotiable
note, the affidavit of defence averred that it had been given as the con-
sideration for land agreed to be purchased from the payee, that mate-
rial conditions in the agreement, which he specified, had not been per-
formed by payee, that the plaintiff, knowing all the- circumstances, took
it as collateral security for the payee, and for collection, and paid nothing
for it. iel, that these thcts put the plaintiff on no higher ground
than the original holder, and that they were a good defence against the
note: Bronson v. Silverman, 77 Pa.
CHARITY. See Constitutional Law.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See insurance.
Title of Statitte-Vl)fning Contents and Prpose of the Act.-The
title of an act was " An Act providing for an equitable division of pro-
perty between Allegheny county and city of Pittsburg." The county
composed a poor district, known as the Allegheny County Iome ; certain
townships or the county were annexed to Pittsburg; two sections of the
act provided that the value of the interest of the annexed townships in
the Home property should be ascertained and paid to the guardians of
the poor of Pittsburg ; the third section extended the provisions of the
act to Allegheny City as provided for Pittsburg, ld, that the two
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sections were constitutional, and did not contain more than one subject
which was not expressed in the title : Allegheny County Rome's Case,
77 Pa.
Even if the third section were unconstitutional, that did not affect
the constitutionality of the other sections: .l.
All that is required is that the title fairly give notice of the subject
of the act, so as reasonably to lead to an inquiry into its body : Id.
The title should not mislead or tend to avert inquiry into the contents
of the act : Id.
Public Use- Churity- chools-Exemption from Taxation.-In sec-
tion 2, article 12, of the Constitutioi, which authorizes the General As-
sembly to exempt from taxation the classes of property therein described,
the word "public" is used, in some instances, to describe the owneffship
of the property, in others as merely descriptive of til use to which the
property is applied. As applied to school-houses, it is used in the
former sense ; and by " public school-houses" is meant such as belong
to the public, and are designed for schools established and conducted
under public authority: Gerke, County Treasurer, v. Purcell, 25 Ohio
State.
The fact that the use of property is free, is not a necessary element in
determining whether the use is public or not. If the use is of such a
nature as concerns the public, and the right to its enjoyment is open to
the public upon equal terms, the use will be public, whether compensa-
tion be exacted or not. Whether the use is free or not, becomes ma-
terial only where some other element is involved than that of its public
character, as, for instance, whether the use is charitable as well as pub-
lie : rel.
A charity, in a legal sense, includes not only gifts for the benefit of
the poor, but endowments for the advancement of learning, or institutions
for the encouragement of science and art, without any particular refer-
ence to the poor : Id.
Schools established by private donations, and which are carried on for
the benefit of the public, and not with a view to profit, are " institutions
or purely public charity" within the meaning of the provision of the
Constitution, which authorizes such institutions to be exempt from taxa-
tion: 11.
The Constitution, in directing the levying of taxes and in authorizing
exemptions from taxation, has reference to property, and the uses to
which it is applied; and where property is appropriated to the support
of a charity which is purely public, the legislature may exempt it from
taxation, without reference to the manner in which the title is held, and
without regard to the form or character of the organization adopted ti
administer the charity : Id.-
The express authority given in the Constitution to exempt from taxa-
tion "houses used exclusively for public worship," carries with it,
impliedly, authority to exempt such grounds as may be reasonably
necessary for their use; but such grounds must subserve the same exclu-
sive use to which the buildings are required to be devoted : Id.
A parsonage, although built on ground which might otherwise be ex-
emapt as attached to the church edifice, does not come within the exemp-
tion. The ground in such case is appropriated to a new and different
use Instead of being used exclusively for public worship, it becomes
VoL. XXIII.-95
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a place of private residence. The exemption is not of such houses as
may be used for the support of public worship, but of houses used exclu-
.ively as pleaces of* public worship : Id.
Legislative Power to Legitimate COldren.-Land was devised " to
my son Thomas * * * to have and to hold to him and his heirs and
assigns, subject to the legacies hereinafter mentioned and charged upon
the same, provided that if my son Thomas should die without an heir,
then all the bequeathments to him shall be divided between my son
Alexander and his children, their heirs and assigns for ever." The
testator left other children and grandchildren, who would be heirs of
Thomas: Ileld, that " die without an heir," meant die without a child
capable of inheriting from him : lcGunnigle v. MeKee, 77 Pa.
Thomas had an illegitimate daughter, who was legitimatized by Act
of Assembly, and made "capable to inherit and transmit any estate as
fully as if she had been born in lawful wedlock." Thomas devised the
above land to his daughter. Held, that the land passed to her ; td.
By the act the daughter became for all purposes of inheritance the
lawful child and prospective heir of Thomas, and vested with the same
inheritable blood as if born to him on* that day in wedlock : Id.
From that time till his death Thomas had a child capable of inherit-
ing from him; the child having survived ihim, the condition of the
devise to him was fulfilled and the estate became absolute in him : It.
The legislature has power to remove the legal taint, either by general
or special law, for all purposes of future inlleritance : Id.
The averment of the parentage of a child in an Act of Assembly
legitimatizing it, is primam' facie evidence of 'its truthfulness: Id.
CONTRACT.
Public Policy-Damages.--A contract to forbear purchasing an in-
terest in certain lands at private sale, and to assist another in the pur-
chase thereof, is not void as against public policy: Morrison v. Darling,
47 Vt.
The plaintiff had purchased four undivided fifths of certain lands,
but failed to purchase the other fifth because the defendants purchased
it in violation of such contract ; whereupon the plaintiff procured par-
tition thereof by the Probate Court. Held, that the true rule of damages
was, what the fifth purchased by the defendants was worth more than
what the plaintiff would have had to pay for it but for its purchase by
the defendant; and that the plaintiff could not recover the expense of
such partition : Id.
CORPORATION.
Quo VMarrato-Status as to 'tizenship.-Where a company of in-
dividuals associated themselves together for the purpose of manufac-
turing paper and flour, and organized as a corporation in accordance
with the firms prescribed by the statute, establishing their office and
place of corporate business in Ohio : Held, that they thereby became a
legal corporation of Ohio, notwithstanding it was the secret intention
of its members, at the time of their organization, to carry on their
manufacturing operations exclusively in another state, and notwithstand-
ing the fact that they have ever since carried them on adcordingly:
State of Ohio, on relation of the Attorney- General, v. Taylor et al., 25
Ohio State.
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A proceeding in guo warranto to dissolve a corporation, or declare a
forfeiture of its charter, or to oust it from the exercise of franchises
which it usurps, must be against the corporation itself, and not merely
against its individual members : Id.
DAMAGES. See Contract; .AXunicipal Corporation.
EQUITY. See Evidence.
ESTOPPEL.
Assertions as to Title.-Barney, being about to buy land of Vensel,
and hearing that Keating had a claim to part of it, asked Keating, with-
out saying he wished to buy, if he claimed any of the land. Keating
said "le thought he claimed part, but it did not amount to much, and
he did not calculate to give Vensel much trouble about it." From this
Barney thought the title was good, and afterwards bought it. Held,
that in this there was neither such frau.d, encouragement nor silence as
would estop Keating from recovering the land from Barney's vendee:
Keating et al. v. Orne et al., 77 Pa.
Keating stating that he had a claim should have put Barney on in-
quiry; omitting to do so, he took the risk of the claim: Id.
Whether an estoppel results from established facts is a question for
the determination of the court: Id.
An estoppel operates to hold one to facts as he alleges them, although
'false; and not for the purpose of proving the facts different from the
statement: Id.
A naked declaration of an intention, made to one giving no reason
for the inquiry, will not prevent the assertion of a right contrary to
such intention : Id.
EVIDENCE. See Partnership.
Handwriting-Experts-fusband and Wfe- WMtness.-nder the
'Act of April 15th 1869, a wife may be called by her husband as a wit-
ness, notwithstanding she may be compelled on cross-examination to give
testimony against him; the act provides for the comptency of the wit-
ness, not for the effect of her testimony: .Ballentine v. White, 77 Pa.
After direct evidence has been given as to the genuineness of writ-
ings, the testimony of experts is admissible, either to attack or support
the instruments: Id.
In equitable ejectments, the judge acts as chancellor, with the assist-
ance of the jury, to determine the credibility of witnesses and questions
of fact on conflicting evidence : Id.
The character of the whole case must satisfy the chancellor that the
equity is clearly, not doubtfully, established by the evidence, if believed:
Id.
As parties are now witnesses, if their testimony is in direct conflict,
whether the chancery rule, that when the equity is distinctly denied
by the defendant, the denial must prevail unless there be other evi-
dence than the testimony of the plaintiff alone, shall operate, not decided:
Id.
EXECUTION.
Leasehold to be treated on Levy as Realty.-A leasehold being a'
chattel real by reason of its fixed and permanent character, can under
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an execution be seized and held only as real estate; not as personal
goods, susceptible of transportation: Titusville Novelty I'on WnrlAs' A.
peal, 77 Pa.
Tlhe sheriff is no more responsible for a leasehold estate levied on than
he would be for real estate : d.
The levy or a leasehold can be only by description of the realty out
of which it iss,,es : Id.
Unde- a fi. fi. LIailst a lessee, the sheriff went upon premises leased,
exaninel then), &c. ; afterwards and out of view of them lie endorsed a
description of them on his writ, and returned that he had levied on
them as described. Held a good levy : Id.
Al inaccurate description of a levy may be explained by oral evi-
dence : Al.
FORMER ]RECOVERY.
Echlencc.-Tn assumpsit before a justice, the defendant therein re-
lied in defence wholly upon showing a settlement of the plaintiff's claim,
•anid expressly refused to present any claim in offset, or to submit any
question for the determination of the justice, except the question of set-
tlenient. On cross-examination the defendant, was inquired of and tes-
tified ai to certain items of deal between him and the plaintiff, and the
plaintiff testified as to the same matter. The justice finding those items
credited to the detndant on the plaintiff's book, allowed themn to the
defendant in offset, and rendered judgimemit for the plaintiff for the
balance, from which no appeal was taken. Held, in a suit by that de-
fcndant apiinst that plaintiff, that those items were barred by that judg-
ment: Gilbert v. Earl, 47 Vt.
When the record of a judgment does not show of what the judgment
was made up, it is competent to show that fact by evidence aliunde : M.
GARNISHEE. See Attachment.
HIatG1WAY. See Municipal Corporation.
Smfficicncy-Eltdene-.T)ju'.-In case for injury upon a highway,
the plaintiff submitted to one personal examination by the defindant's
inedical witnesses during trial, but refused to submit to another, for the
alleged rcoson that she was too feeble and exhausted. h1eld. that, to
rebut any unfavorable influence that might be drawn against her for the
refulsal, it was competent for her to show that some time before the trial,
when the agent of a railroad company that had been vouched in to de-
fend, and which the town claimed was liable over to it, visited her in
company with one of* the selectmen of the town, she requested that the
company send physicians to examine her, to ascertain how badly she
was injured : Durgin aiul 1Vrfe v. Town of Danville, 47 Vt.
It was held, that under the events and circumstances that constituted
anld characterized the accident in question, noirigorous rule of law could
be formulated by which it could be determinnd that a given width of
travelled track, in a certain depth of snow, and bounded by banks of a
given height and slope, would constitute a highway in good and sufficient
repair : Id.
The court reftised to charge that if the plaintiff had driven over the
road iin question once to three times a week for three weeks previous to
the accident, and was acquainted with the road, and at the time of the
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accident was driving a horse perfectly under control, and it was light
enough to see the banks of snow, and the passage through the drifts
was six feet wide, and lie drove on to the bank and tipped over, it was
such carelessness that, as matter of law, no recovery could be had, as
with ordinary care lie could have driven such a horse over such a road.
.feld, no error: Id.
INSURANCE.
Mutual Company.-Persons insuring in a mutual insurance company
are associated in the nature of limited or special partners: .I& ugh v.
Lycoming Fire 14s. Co., 77 Pa. -
An insurance company was incorporated by Act of Assembly in 1840;
the insured to deposit a note in a sum fixed by the directors, of which
ten per cent. was to be immediately paid and part or whole of the
remainder when the directors should deem it requisite for the payment
of' losses and expeuses, and at the expiration of the insurance, so much
of the note as remained unpaid to be given up. A supplement in 1842,
authorized a lien, waiving inquisition, on the property of the insured
for the amount due on the note, the company filing a memorandum con-
taining the name of insured, description of property, "amount of the
note unpaid," &c. Hcld, that the act was valid: Id.
Def-.dant insured in 1870, the policy stipulating that he accepted it
subject to the terms, &c., of " the act of incorporation and by-laws," &c.
.Held, that this waived his right to require the company to collect an
assessment on the note otherwise than by the Act of 1842 : Id.
The' Constitution of the United States or of Pennsylvania did not pre-
clude his waiving a trial byjury and agreeing to the manner in which
judgment might be entered against him: Ild.
JOINT CONTRACTORS. See Vendor.
JUDGMENT.
Collateral Impeachment'of Judgment merel1y voidable.-The general
rule is, that judgments which appear to have been regularly obtained,
are conclusive upon parties and privies, and cannot be impeached in any
collateral proceeding. If one against whom such judgment be obtained
would avoid it, he must do so by some proceeding instituted for that
purpose, and in which an issue can be formed upon the question affect-
ing its validity. Hence, case will not lie for arrest and imprisonment
upon an execution issued upon a judgment merely voidable, but not void:
Kimball v. Town of Newport, 47 Vt.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Defective Highway-lee and Snow-Damages.-A municipal cor-
poration is liable for damages for injuries for neglect of its officers in not
keeping its streets, roads and bridges in repair: IeLaughlin v. City of
Corry, 77 Pa.
If the municipal authorities are negligent in allowing a dangerous ob-
struction in a public highway, which they could have removed, they are
liable for damages tQ a person injured thereby without any fault of his
own : JR.
A city allowed ice and snow to accumulate in drifts and ridges on a
sidewalk and remain for weeks, the plaintiff in passing lawfully on the
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walk slipped on it, fell and injured himself. Whether the snow and ice
had so accumulated by default of the officers of the city, and whether by
reason thereof the plaintiff was injured, were for the jury, and if so the
city was liable to the plaintiff ibr damages : Id..
If the obstruction was of such long duration as to be generally observa-
ble, the city was chargeable with constructive notice: I.
The measure of damages to plaintiff would be the direct expenses by
reason of the injury, the inconvenience he was subjected to, pain, pecu-
niary loss sustained and likely to be sustained during life, and his actual
permanent loss of earning power from the accident: Id.
What the plaintiff might be receiving as wages would not go in miti-
gation of damages, but might be considered with other things as going
to prove what his earning powers were: Id.
NATIONAL BANK.
Indebtedness of one Person to greater Amount than one-tenth its Capital.
-In a suit by a National Bank against an endorser on notes discounted
for the drawer's accommodation, he filed an affidavit of defence that at
the time of the discount the drawer was indqbted to the bank for money
lent in excess of one-tenth of its capital ; and averred that the loan was
void under the National Bank Act of June: 3d 1864. Held, that the
affidavit was defective in not averring that the excess was knowingly
and voluntarily lent to the drawer: O'Hare v. Second National Bank,
77 Pa.
Accidental excess made in mistake or ignorance' will not forfeit an
honest loan: Id.
Such excess known to the bank only is not such an unlawful act as
will avoid the loan : Id.
The fact of excess of indebtedness is a matter aside from the loan,
not entering into its terms and therefore collateral : Id.
A loan of money and a note taken as security are part of the proper
business of the bank within its power and therefore not illegal in them-
selves: Id.
PARTNERSHIP. See Witness.
Payment to one Partner in Merchandise after Dissolutioi.-Altvater
and Marks, being partners as stone-masons' and having contracts for
buildings, were purchasing stone for their business ; Altvater sold tools
to the defendant, owning a stone-quarry, under a contract that they
should be paid for in stone; the stone were delivered at the time speci-
fied, the firm having been dissolved previously; Altvater used them for
his own purposes. Held, that the payment fbr the tools by delivery of
stone to Altvatcr was good, although after dissolution, if defendant did
not know of the dissolution : Kerney v. Altvater, 77 Pa.
The purchase of stone by Altvatcr was within the scope of the firm's
business, and the payment by delivery of the stone to him was in fulfil-
ment of the contract: 17.
The misapplication by Altvater of the stone did not impair the valid-
ity of the payment: Id.
A delivery in good faith to one partner, according to a contract, is a
delivery to both ; each having authority to receive it : Rd.
A person dealing with a firm must have actual notice of dissolution in
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order to avoid his transactions with one of the partners after dissolution
Id.
A letter stating the dissolution of a firm, sent by mail properly di-
rected to dcfendant, with evidence that the letter was not returned from
the Dead Letter office, is not sufficient, without other evidence of its
receipt, to charge defendant with notice of the dissolution, but with
slight corroboration a jury might find such notice : Id.
The rule that letters properly directed and marked are evidence as of
the dishonor, &c., of negotiable paper, is restricted to commercial paper:
.Id.
Quo WARRANTO. See Corjoration.
RELEASE. See Vendor.
SALE.
Optional T'mefor Delivery- Tender.-Bonsall bought from the plain-
tiffs for hisfirm 5000 barrels of oil, to be delivered at buyer's option
before December 31st, on ten days' notice, in "bulk cars or bulk boats
at Pittsburg;" if delivered by A. V. or W. P. Railroad, buyer might
designate any other point on those roads; payment to be made as lots
were gauged and delivered. He bought also for himself from plain-
tiffs 5000 barrels on precisely the same terms. On the 21st of Decem-
ber Bonsall gave plaintiffs two notices in the same terms to deliver the
respective lots of oil, at such point or landing as he might designate,
&c. The plaintiffs shipped all the oil to Pittsburg on 30th of Decem-
ber, had it inspected and gauged, and on 31st told Bonsall they would
give him the numbers of the cars that he might examine; he made no
reply, but shortly afterwards, on the same day, gave plaintiffs notice to
deliver at the Anchor works on A. V. Railroad; plaintiffs directed the
oil to be delivered there; there not being room for all on that siding, the
nearest sidings were filled, ready to put on Anchor siding as the others
were emptied; they tendered to Bonsall 5981 barrels in bulk, the extra
981 to be on his own contract. He refused to receive, giving no reason.
Feld, that it was for the jury whether the tender was sufficient: Loch-
hart et al. v. Bonsall et al., 77 Pa.
It was Bonsall's duty to give reasonable notice of the place of de-
livery and to be there ready to receive and pay for the oil: Id.
The Anchor siding not having room to hold the cars, it was sufficient
if the plaintiffs put the oil on the nearest sidings, ready to be moved on
the Anchor siding as it was emptied : Id.
The sufficiency of the tender is to be determined by all the facts and
circumstances connected with it and the motives of the parties - 11.
Bonsall was not bound to accept more or less than his contract, but if
there was a larger quantity, from which he might separate the 5000 bar-
rels, it not being plaintiffs' engagement to pump the oil from the cars,
it was sufficient: 
Id.
If the plaintiffs offered in good faith to deliver the oil, they were not
bound to set apart the precise quantity named in the contract before
offering to deliver: Id.
ScHooLs. See Constitutional Law.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See Vendor.
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STATUTE. See Constitutional Law.
TRESPASS.
Joint Otoners-Liability of several Owners- for joint Trespass.-
Tenants in possession may be sued jointly in an action for trespass com-
mitted by animals kept by them in common upon the premises, although
the several animals -are owned by them separately and individually
Jack v. Iudnall, 25 Ohio State.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Sale-Effect of Release by one endor,-If one joint vendee release
his interest in a joint right of action against the vendor for false and
fraudulent representations made in the sale, the interest of the other
vendees is thereby released, although the releasor assumed to release
only his own interest: James v. Aiken, 47 Vt.
The plaintiff had given such release, and received $1000 therefor.
Afterwards he paid notes executed jointly by himself and the defendant
and others, joint vendees, for the purpose of raising funds to pay towards
the property purchased, and brought this suit for contribution. .eld,
that the defendant was entitled to share in the 1000 ; that to that ex-
tant the plaintiff never had claim for contribution against him; and
that, as it was not in extinguishment of any cause of action that ever
existed, the transaction might be shown' under the general issue, and
notice under § 32, ch. 30, of the Gen. Stats., was not necessary : Id.
Specific Performance- Unhealthiness of Place.-In negotiating for
the sale of a farm, on the inquiry of the vendee who declined to pur-
chase unless the neighborhood was not sickly, the vendor assured him
that it was free from sickness, the vendee then entered into articles for
the purchase. The neighborhood was subject to fever and ague. It
was held the agreement could not be enforced: Holmes's Appeal, 77 Pa.
It seems that such agreement would not be enforced if the neighbor-
hood was unhealthy and the vendee was" ignorant of it, even if there
'had been no misrepresentation by the verdor: Id
WITNESS. See Evidence.
Party- Competency where other Party dead-Partners.-Where one
partner is dead, in a suit against the survivor for a claim against the
firm, the plaintiff is not a competent witness, under the Act of April
15th 1869: Hanna v. Wray, 77 Pa.
When a party to a: thing or contract is dead and his rights have passed
by his own act or that of the law to another representing his interest in
the controversy, the survivor to that subject cannot testify to matters
occurring in the life of the deceased party : Id.
The rights and liabilities of a deceased partner under the partner.
ship, devolve upon the surviving partner : Id.
In the settlement of the partnership account of the survivor with the
representatives of the deceased partner, the survivor would be entitled
to credit for a judgment for a firm debt recovered against him without
his collusion or neglect: Id.
Whether plaintiff was competent under a special offer to testify as to
matters between him and the surviving partner only, not decided : Id.
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